Turkey at a Crossroads

Turkey at a Crossroads: A Multifaceted Look at the Impediments to Turkey’s EU Candidacy

by Soren Lagaard


In 1993, as the Soviet Union imploded from its internal rot, Samuel Huntington, a controversial political scientist, published an essay entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?” that articulated a vision of the future, post-Soviet world.1 With the end of the Cold War marking the last of the “Western civil wars,” Huntington believed the long-exploited and marginalized non-West would come to the fore in a new pattern of conflict. These non-Western “civilizations,” defined loosely by cultural similarities of geography, language, history, customs, and most importantly, religion, would become the new organizational blocs from which societies would form their identities and future world conflict would emerge. In particular, Huntington believed this conflict between blocs would center on geographical “fault lines.” One such widely perceived fault line is Turkey. Fifteen years after Huntington articulated his thesis, and 85 years after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put Turkey on the path toward Westernization, Turkey continues to be a nation at a crossroads between “East” and “West.” Vying for acceptance as a full member in the European Union (EU), yet grounded in the Middle Eastern cultural tradition and a secularist republic with an overwhelmingly religious Muslim population, Turkey clearly is a nation with deep cleavages. In this context, this essay will focus on both the unofficial, subtextual apprehensions and the official publicized criteria for Turkey’s admission to the EU. To join the EU, Turkey faces many challenges, including external perceptions, internal divisions, cultural confrontations and political compromise. However, if these difficulties are overcome, Turkish inclusion among the nations of the European Union might act as a bridge—rather than as a fault—between the West and the Islamic world.


A Question of Compatibility


Although the European Union has established detailed entrance requirements for potential member states, it would be unwise to assume that these requirements are the sole factors used to evaluate the possibility of Turkish membership. The first state to apply for membership with an overwhelming Islamic population, as well as the first state with roots in an empire hostile to Western Europe, Turkey is no ordinary accession candidate. Two gray areas merit an examination of Turkey’s European compatibility: what makes one “European,” and what it means to embrace and engender human rights.


Defining “Europe”

What is Europe? In recent years, the question of what defines Europe—whether history, culture, geography, religion, or something else entirely—has been a much-debated topic. Benedict Anderson’s view of the nation (or in this case, supranational body) as an “imagined community” is helpful to frame the question of what Europeans imagine as being “European.” Since being a part of “Europe” has been a prerequisite to apply for EU membership, many contend that Turkey is not part of Europe and is therefore ineligible.2 The president of France—and the next rotating president of the EU—Nicolas Sarkozy indicated his hostility to considering Turkey as a part of Europe in an interview:

Seventy-five million people live in Turkey. This number will rise to 100 million in 25 years. This is a huge number of people who are not European… Shall we build Europe with those who are not Europeans?3

Of course, whether or not Turkey is European depends on one’s definition. The following is an overview of prevailing definitions of what EU citizens believe constitutes Europe.



The argument for the geographic conception of the European community is that Europe is defined by the physical space it has historically occupied. However, this area has varied over the past several centuries. A Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) report to the German government, “Towards a Pan-European Union,” notes that in the Middle Ages, “Europe” was thought to extend only to the Don River in the east. However, after the rule of Russia’s Peter the Great, the European border was extended to the Ural Mountains.4 Ultimately, the variability of “Europe” illustrates that the meaning is a social construction. Assuming the modern assessment of the European continent, the Bosporus and the Dardanelle Mountains divide Turkey between Europe and Asia. Therefore, with roughly 4 percent of its total landmass in Europe, Turkey’s slim foothold on the continent suggests that, technically speaking, Turkey is indeed a part of Europe.



The basis of a historical view of Europe is that it possesses a shared and unique history. This theory argues that a common cultural bond has developed in Europe from experiencing collective “cultural building blocks,” including the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Reformation.5 Although influenced by these movements, the Ottoman Empire, forerunner to the Turkish state, never directly participated. Furthermore, the long history of conflict between the Ottoman Turks and European kingdoms is cited as an indication of irreconcilable differences between Turkey and Europe. From the fall of the Christian Byzantine Empire in 1453 until the formation of modern Turkey in 1923, armed conflict was a primary characteristic of Ottoman Turkey’s interaction with Europe.6 Indicative of this was the Battle of Vienna in 1683 that saw the Turkish advance into Europe finally halted at the gates of Vienna only by a combined Polish-Austrian-Holy League force.7 Fears of the military might of the Ottomans disseminated through European cultures—the French croissant, for instance, was invented to celebrate the defeat of their would-be crescent moon conquerors.

The perception of Turkey as a historically European invader persists today, and clichés equating the admission of Turkey into the EU with the Battle of Vienna are common. In 2004, the outgoing Dutch European Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, warned that if Turkey were to join the EU, “the relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain.”8 Even Europeans of Turkish ancestry share this perception; during a 2001 interview, Hasan Ozdogan, the president of the Islamic Council for Germany, reminded the reporter that while the ancestors of the modern Austrians and Germans stopped Ottoman Turkey at the gates of Vienna, today he “just had to take the plane to get in.”9 These instances underscore how historically informed modern national identities, such as Germans and Turks, are still differentiated in exclusionary historical and cultural terms despite holding common citizenship.10 Thus, those viewing Turkey as historically distinct are unlikely to see the country as European.



The long tradition of Christianity in Europe is also suggested as the defining characteristic of the European community, especially in relation to overwhelmingly Muslim Turkey. This view has some prominent supporters—most notably, the current pope, Benedict XVI. During the 50th anniversary celebrations of the European Union, the pope asserted that the new Europe “cannot be built by ignoring its people’s identities,” a veiled reference to the lack of acknowledgement of Europe’s Christian roots in the presently defunct EU Constitution.11 Moreover, as recently as three years ago, Benedict, then known as Cardinal Ratzinger, stated his belief that as the successor to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey stands “in permanent contrast to Europe.”12 While he has now repudiated these comments, they are indicative of a widely held sentiment in the EU.

Indeed, those who believe that Christianity primarily defines the European Community also argue against Turkish EU membership on the basis of Turkey’s 95 percent Muslim population.13 The latest prominent manifestation of anti-Muslim sentiment in the EU was a controversial Dutch film critical of the Qur’an that contained graphics illustrating the growth of Muslim populations in Europe.14 If the majority of Europeans’ views of Turkey are influenced by anti-Muslim sentiment, Turkey stands little chance of being accepted as a European state. Huntington’s thesis argues for a religious homogeneity within cultures, because “It is difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.”15 Many feel that adding a country of 70 million Muslims to the EU would pose a threat to a tradition of European Christianity.


A Malleable Definition

The above definitions are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, many who oppose Turkey’s acceptance may embrace multiple conceptions of Europe that exclude Turkey. However, there is another, more nuanced, viewpoint than the previously discussed definitions of Europe that argues geography, history, and religion are too narrow and subjective to form a comprehensive definition. Rather, this broader definition acknowledges that Europe has and has always had flexible “imagined borders,” and that increased interaction among state actors can lead to an expansion of these borders. The WRR report supports this assertion:

The way in which the mutual borders are per- ceived can also change gradually in response to growing interaction between EU member states and surrounding countries through trade and investment, professional exchanges and tourism.16

As Turkey and the EU grow more economically, socially, and politically interconnected, so too does the prevailing view expand to consider Turkey as European. Indeed, Turkey has already thoroughly integrated itself into the security treaties of Europe, having been a member of NATO for over 50 years. Like NATO, the EU has refrained from explicitly defining “Europe,” in part to avoid such contentious discussions. However, the European Commission implicitly accepted this malleable definition of Europe when it declared Turkey an eligible candidate and opened accession talks in 2005, 46 years after Turkey’s first application to the European Economic Community.17


Turkey, Islam, and Human Rights


Guaranteeing the protection of human rights is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union and a necessary prerequisite for membership consideration. In Turkey’s case, the question is often asked: Does the predominance of Islam in Turkey impede the protection of human rights? Furthermore, can such a protection create a common basis of interaction for the EU and Turkey? Here, we must examine both the theoretical and legal frameworks for human rights, as well as their actual implementation.


Theoretical Compatibilities

Before comparing human rights law of the EU and Turkey, we should answer the question, what does the European Union define as human rights? The now-defunct European Constitution provides an answer in article I-2:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.18

It is important to note the absence of religion as either a criterion or a “value” of the Union. Indeed, during the 2004 drafting process, some interest groups, including the Vatican, sought to frame the EU as a “Christian community of values,” which would have automatically made Turkey ineligible for membership. The most recent attempt at an EU Constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon, was ratified in December 2007 and also does not mention religion.19 Despite their differing religious traditions, and the fact that both the EU and Turkey protect the free exercise of religion, it is not a defining aspect of the EU.20 Moreover, Turkey’s 1982 Constitution, like the EU Constitution, also fails to mention religion:

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the Preamble.21

The Preamble mentions “sacred religious feelings,” but only in the context that they should not interfere with the conduct of the state. The “nationalism of Atatürk” was in no way religious. It would seem that, at least on paper, not only do both Turkey and the EU make explicit references to the guarantee of human rights, but they also avoid religion as either an inspiration or criterion of their basic value systems. Moreover, these constitutions both base their legitimacy on the protection and furthering of human rights, which might serve as a common basis of interaction and lend themselves to a fruitful relationship.


State Interaction with Religion

One likely explanation for religion’s absence in the Turkish Constitution is the secular nature of the Turkish state. Dating back to the origins of modern Turkey in 1922, secularism was a rigidly enforced principle of Kemalism—after Mustafa Atatürk Kemal, the man who founded, led, and pushed the Turkish state toward the West after World War I. His notion of secularist democracy was derived from the French concept of laïcité, serving as a blueprint whereby religious organizations were funded through the government, and religious speech was tightly controlled.22 With the ultimate goal of Europeanizing the state, modern Turkey was able to develop independent of its historical Islamic character.

Paradoxically, although Europe inspired Turkish secularism, many EU member states have close ties with religion or have official state-sponsored religions. In a 2000 survey, it was estimated that 30 out of 48 European states promoted “[one] religion or religious institution.”23 Britain is considered to be the state most involved in religion: The relationship between political and religious authorities is formalized, and public funding supports the Church of England. Additionally, the prime minister is able to appoint the head of the Church of England (archbishop of Canterbury) as well as 26 lesser bishops.24 Ironically, Turkey’s secularism appears stronger than some EU member states.


Islamic Extremism

While it is clear that the Turkish state protects human rights and is staunchly secular, institutional protections mean little if the populace does not support these principles. Most Muslims in Turkish society embrace what can be loosely termed “modern values.” A 2006 Pew Survey found that 60 percent of respondents indicated they saw “no natural conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society.”25 However, Turkey is no stranger to violent religious extremism. In November 2003, al-Qaeda-affiliated suicide bombers blew up the British Consulate, the HSBC Bank, and two synagogues in Istanbul, killing dozens and wounding hundreds of people.26 Later, it was learned that the suicide bombers were Turks, which made this incident the first instance of homegrown Islamic terrorism on Turkish soil.27 There are several other active terrorist groups in Turkey, such as the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front (IBDA-C), which “refuses to recognize the Turkish state and wants to heal the divisions in the Islamic world.”28 The terrorist groups that seek to destroy the Turkish state and replace it with “Islam, not only as a religion, but also as civilization” pose a threat to Turkish secular democracy.29

Active Islamic extremism in Turkey supports Huntington’s view, as well as many who are opposed to Turkish EU membership, that Turkey is a fundamentally “torn country” with a potential to be subjected to a radical Islamic revolution.30 However, such an uprising seems unlikely since modern national sentiment is closely intertwined with the Turkish secular state, which thus continues to have strong sup- port. In a 2006 Pew Survey, 67 percent of respondents indicated they identified with “modernizers,” while only 16 percent identified themselves as “fundamentalists.”31 Trends indicate that this figure has remained relatively consistent.

Even though radical Islamists seem to pose little threat to the Turkish state, Turkey has recently been embroiled in a bitter political conflict over its secularist constitution. Since 2002, the ruling party has been the Islamist Adalet ve Kalkınma (AK) party. Some secular areas of the Turkish goverment, including the military, believe the party’s aims might be to turn Turkey into an Islamic shari’a law state. Last year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan nominated a fellow party member to the largely ceremonial presidency, provoking an outrage from the military and secularist elite. Presently, a legal challenge is moving through Turkey’s heavily pro-secularist court that aims to dissolve the AK party, a method that has been used in the past to dissolve parties accused of being Islamist.32 These continued interjections into healthy democratic discourse underscore the unresolved tensions between Turkey’s historically Muslim cultural identity and secularist modernity.

This continuous conflict will also complicate Turkey’s EU bid; in a recent statement, the EU enlargement commissioner said that “the prohibition or dissolution of political parties is a far-reaching measure which should be used with the utmost restraint,” and emphasized that the court case may detract from action on reforms required for EU membership.33 Thus, Turkey must definitively resolve this conflict between Islamist modernizers and secularist institutions before admission to the EU.

The described conflict between secularism and the AK illustrates two critical concerns about the structure and institutions of the Turkish state and their complex relationship with Islam. First, since the establishment of the modern Turkish state, the military has assumed a leading role in protecting Atatürk’s legacy. Arguably, Atatürk desired this role for the military; in 1931, he declared, “the Turkish nation… considers its army the guardian of its ideals.”34 Even though Atatürk was a democratic reformer, he was also a general. Therefore, it was relatively logical that the military assumed not only Atatürk’s military stature but also the democratic mantle of Kemalist reform ideology. Whenever the military has perceived that secularism is at risk, or its own power is threatened, it has not hesitated to intervene in the democratic processes of the state. To varying degrees, this has happened four times—in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997.35 The military’s propensity to meddle with, or even overthrow, the government was demonstrated just last year. During the dispute involving the AK party prime minister’s appointment of a fellow party member president, the military issued a thinly veiled threat that “it would move against the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan if religion was allowed to enter too far into politics.”36 Given its record over the past six years, the ruling party, although of Islamist origins, has little, if any, intention of altering the secular nature of the Turkish state. So long as the military issues threats to the democratically elected government, it will continue to undermine Turkey’s credibility to the EU as a stable democracy.

In 2006, the most recent Turkey Progress Report noted two important areas in which the military’s role needed clarification and/or regulation. First, the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law and the NSC laws, both of which define the Turkish military’s responsibilities, “grant the military a wide margin of manoeuvre”; as evidenced above, these legal reforms are needed to remove the validation for military intervention.37 Second, the military’s budget is largely unconstrained by the government, and as a result, “no further progress has been achieved in terms of strengthening parliamentary overseeing of the military budget and expenditures.”38

Third are concerns about the state’s ability to guarantee the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression to all. The 2006 Turkey Progress Report states, “non-Muslim religious communities have no access to legal personality and continued to face restricted property rights.”39 Should these non-Muslim groups encounter legal difficulties, they have few institutionally based opportunities for appeal. Additionally, the report notes that despite a law passed to the contrary, many official documents, including ID cards, still indicate an individual’s religious affiliation, which “leaves open the potential for discriminatory practices.”40 Finally, freedom of expression conflicts with Article 301 of the Penal Code, which prohibits insulting “Turkishness.” This article continues to be a broadly interpreted law that can unfairly restrict a variety of free expression. Most prominently, Hrant Dink, a renowned Turkish journalist, was sentenced to six months in prison in 2006 for violating Article 301 by writing a series of contentious articles on the Armenian genocide.41 The broad enforcement of Article 301 leads many individuals to practice self-censorship, which further stifles freedom of expression. For Turkey to respect fully the right to freedom of religion and expression, such constraining laws must be reformed.


The Cyprus Question


Despite the legal and principled compatibility between the EU and Turkey, the official opinion of the European Union states that serious challenges remain as to Turkey’s candidacy. One well-documented impediment is the conflict in Cyprus. Since 1974, Turkey has been embroiled in a bitter dispute with Greece, now a EU member state, in Cyprus that has created a dispute with the European Union. The conflict began in 1974 when the Greek Cypriots sought to instigate a coup in coordination with the ruling Greek military junta in Greece. Turkey, fearing that Turkish Cypriots might be threatened, invaded the northern third of the island and proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The result is an impasse that remains to this day. In 2004, as the nonoccupied part of Cyprus was about to enter the European Union, the Annan Plan for Cyprus proposed the reunification of Cyprus in a loose form of Swiss-style federal system. Under this structure, both jurisdictions would have a substantive, and in certain areas, equal role in governing the island. The plan was approved in Turkish northern Cyprus, but the Greek south was unwilling to compromise since its government maintains it is the only legitimate political entity on the island. The EU did little to encourage reunion negotiations and did not require a resolution as a precondition for accession. Thus, only the Greek portion of Cyprus was admitted into the European Union in 2004.42

Turkey’s membership process has largely languished in the past year due to Cyprus—even resulting in the suspension of some of its negotiations with the European Union. Turkey has refused to implement the “Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement,” which mandated the free movement of goods between Turkey and all European member states. As Turkey and Cyprus consider themselves to be in a conflict, Turkey has refused to allow Cypriot ships to dock at Turkish ports. The European Commission thus issued a report in November 2006 that a failure to implement this protocol would result in the closing of some aspects of the accession talks.43 Recently, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders have agreed to revive negotiations, and with new political leadership in both Cypriot governments, the impetus may now exist to solve this lengthy conflict.44


In Sum: Turkey Is Compatible


The sections above have attempted to disprove three myths about Turkish membership in the European Union. First, that the “definition” of Europe unavoidably excludes Turkey. A plethora of ways exists to define “Europe,” including history, religion, culture, and geography; ultimately, however, each is a subjective social construct. If the question of a European identity is by relationship and by interaction, then the “imagined community” has the flexibility to expand its boundaries. As Turkey continues to increase its economic, social, and political ties with the EU and the Western world, the perception of Turkey as a European nation will take hold in time.

The second dispelled myth is the belief that the principles of the EU are incompatible with a predominantly Muslim nation. This view is erroneous on many levels, most prominently that Turkish Islam, as practiced, is fully compatible with human rights. The EU’s membership criteria does not exclude non-Christian states. Additionally, Turkey grants as much importance to human rights in its constitutional framework as does the EU. Furthermore, both Turkey and the EU separate their notions of human rights from their historic religious affiliations. Lastly, the secular tradition of the Turkish state protects it from overwhelming religious influences. Recent attempts to revise the interface between the secular and religious elements in Turkish society do not threaten to annul this characteristic.

Finally, the belief that Turkey is a “torn country” and has the potential to have its secular character undermined is greatly exaggerated. While there are active Islamic terrorist groups that have carried out successful bombings, they amass neither the means nor the popular support needed to undermine the structure or ideology of the Turkish state. Furthermore, this is not the first time that a European Union member state would have active terrorist organizations; one needn’t look father than Northern Ireland and the IRA for proof.




As this essay has illustrated, Turkey has a twofold challenge to join the European Union: meeting official criteria and assuaging unofficial—but insistent—anxieties. As was highlighted, however, the strongest impediment are the unofficial fears and concerns over Turkey’s accession and not the admission criteria of the EU. Turkey’s history has proven the state to be resilient and flexible. Guided by that history, it seems likely that in the future, Turkey will amend the necessary laws, restructure the economy, reform the military, and solve the political disputes to comply fully with entrance requirements of the

European Union—requirements met by many Eastern European countries with far weaker economies and democracies.

Yet the unease shared by citizens, politicians, and countries of the EU will likely outlive the official problems. The cause of such preemptive anxiety can be found, to a certain extent, in Huntington’s assertion that culture and religion determine identity. Like Huntington, the detractors to Turkish membership focus solely on what divides cultures and populations, rather than the common aspects—such as shared belief in universal human rights. The Turkish nation and the European Union have much to offer each other—economic gain, cultural exposure, religious diversity—that would benefit all EU citizens. Most of all, in this world increasingly viewing itself as divided between Islam and the West, the nation of Turkey could act as a bridge, rather than a fault, between civilizations.

Soren Lagaard is a senior in the College of Arts and Sciences at Boston College. He is a double major in history and political science.


  1. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Journal of Foreign Affairs, 72, no.3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.
  2. Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, The European Union, Turkey and Islam, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 27.
  3. Dimitar Tabakov, “Sarkozy Says Turkey Not Part of Europe,” News.bg, http://international.ibox.bg/news/id_1059504317 (accessed May 10, 2007).
  4. Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy, Towards a Pan-European Union (The Hague: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), 32.
  5. Netherlands Scientific Council, Towards a Pan-European Union, 33.
  6. The Catholic Encyclopedia of America, “Crusades,” New Advent, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04543c.htm (accessed May 10, 2007).
  7. Donald Quataret, “The Ottoman Empire: 1700–1922,” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 38.
  8. Ian Traynor, “In 1683 Turkey was the invader. In 2004 much of Europe still sees it that way,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/22/eu.turkey (accessed April 9, 2008).
  9. Mustafa Malik, “Islam in Europe: Quest for a Paradigm,” Middle East Policy Journal, 7, no. 2 (June 2001).
  10. Lee Hudson Teslik, “Turks at Europe’s Gates,” Council on Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, http://www.cfr.org/publication/14396/turks_at_europes_gates.html (accessed March 20, 2008).
  11. Ian Traynor, “As the EU turns 50, Pope says it’s on path to oblivion,” The Guardian, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,2042887,00.html (accessed May 10, 2007).
  12. Ian Fisher and Sabrina Tavernise, “Pope Backs Turkey’s Bid to Join European Union,” NYTimes.com, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/europe/29pope.html?ex=1322456400&en=a966c167d1894bb3&ei=5088 (accessed May 10, 2007).
  13. The European Union, Turkey and Islam, 73.
  14. “Dutch MP posts Islam film on web,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7317506.stm (accessed March 27, 2008).
  15. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” 27.
  16. Towards a Pan-European Union, 33.
  17. Ibid., 34.
  18. “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,” Official Journal of the EU, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/ JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML (accessed April 17, 2008).
  19. “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,” Official Journal of the EU, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/ JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML (accessed April 17, 2008).
  20. Netherlands Scientific Council, The European Union, Turkey and Islam, 27.
  21. “Constitution of The Republic of Turkey,” Republic of Turkey, http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_i.html#article_1 (accessed May 10, 2007).
  22. Netherlands Scientific Council, The European Union, Turkey and Islam, 42.
  23. Ibid., 33.
  24. Ibid., 31
  25. Robert Ruby, “Can Secular Democracy Survive in Turkey?,” Pew Form on Religion and Public Life, http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=202 (accessed May 10, 2007).
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  28. Netherlands Scientific Council, The European Union, Turkey and Islam, 62.
  29. Ibid.
  30. Glenn E. Perry, “Huntington and his critics: the West and Islam,” Arab Studies Quarterly, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_1_24/ai_93458167/pg_9 (accessed May 10, 2007).
  31. Robert Ruby, “Can Secular Democracy Survive in Turkey?,” Pew Form on Religion and Public Life, http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=202 (accessed May 10, 2007).
  32. “See you in court,” Economist.com, http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_ id=10881280 (accessed March 28, 2008).
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  34. Frank Tachau and Metin Heper, “The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey,” Comparative Politics 16, no. 1 (1983): 20.
  35. Ibid., 24.
  36. Sabrina Tavernise, “Government of Turkey Warns Army,” NYTimes.com, http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=F00D11FF385A0C7A8EDDAD0894DF404482 (accessed May 10, 2007).
  37. “2006 Turkey Progress Report,” European Commission – Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/reports_nov_2006_en.htm (accessed April 17, 2008).
  38. Ibid., 9.
  39. William Chislett, “The EU’s Progress Report On Turkey’s Accession: Derailment Or Shunted Into A Siding?,” Real Instituto Elcano, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/1069.asp (accessed April 11, 2008).
  40. Ibid.
  41. Ibid.
  42. “Annan unveils revised Cyprus plan,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3577733.stm (accessed May 10, 2007).
  43. “Commission presents its recommendation on the continuation of Turkey’s accession negotiations,” Europa Press Releases, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1652&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed May 10, 2007).
  44. Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu, “Cyprus Leaders Agree to Restart Talks on Reunification,” NYTimes.com, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/22/world/europe/22cyprus.html?ref=world (accessed March 22, 2008).

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